Every year, NBA teams deliberately lose games. The draft rewards losing. We ran the math and simulated an NBA designed to stop it.
The NBA is adopting a new draft lottery mechanism this season, the 3-2-1 proposal, meant to reduce tanking incentives. Academics have proposed their own alternatives for decades. The league has tried reforms before. Everyone has a theory about what works. Almost no one has tested them against each other.
We ran 50 consecutive simulated NBA seasons under each of five mechanisms simultaneously, measuring how often strategic teams chose to lose deliberately and whether the draft was actually delivering picks to the teams that needed them most. Then we replaced every front office with an AI agent to see if the same incentive structures held under qualitative reasoning.
One thing drives tanking: the value of a great pick. NBA 2K translates real player performance into numerical ratings. We use those ratings as a proxy for skill. The highest-rated players are the kind of franchise-altering talent that almost always goes first overall.
Making the playoffs pays. Two to four extra home games with sold-out arenas. National TV appearances that drive sponsorship deals. A merchandise surge that lasts for years. Economists estimate the total franchise value boost at around $200 million per appearance. In our model, that's worth 200 points.
Now compare that to the lottery. The average lottery pick is worth about 24 points in player value. Even the number one pick, at 100 points, is only worth that if you win the lottery outright. So why would anyone tank? Because at some point, your playoff odds get low enough that competing isn't worth it anymore. Drag the slider to find that crossover.
Here's a real simulated team navigating one full 82-game season. Each decision point is where the team ran the math and chose whether to compete.
The NBA and researchers have proposed several mechanisms to reduce tanking. Each takes a different approach. Click to explore how each one works.
Every non-playoff team earns 3 tickets per missed season. Record does not matter. Follow one team, two universes, three seasons.
For reference: cost of winning a top pick
Landing a top pick resets your ticket count. The better the pick, the steeper the cost.
Fall to pick five and tanking bought you nothing anyway. Land the best player and you start over. You earned that pick the same way whether you won 20 games or 40.
We ran 50 simulated NBA seasons under each mechanism with strategic teams that calculate their odds every game. Scroll to reveal each mechanism.
Each mechanism creates a different incentive window. Watch how tanking pressure builds, peaks, and cuts off under each set of rules.
Suppressing tanking only matters if the mechanisms also help the teams that genuinely need good picks. We track two things for every mechanism.
Since our simulation assigns each team a true skill level, we know which three teams were genuinely the weakest each season, not just which three lost the most. Among those teams, what pick slots did they end up with? Darker cells mean that range is more common. The row labels tell you whether dark is good or bad. A well-designed mechanism has its darkest cells at the top.
We replaced every team's front office with a Claude Haiku language model, the same AI that powers many commercial chatbots. Each AI received real standings, game counts, and the rules of the mechanism, then had to decide: compete or tank? No hints. No training on the right answer.
No mechanism eliminates tanking entirely. Any lottery that links record to picks will always have some team somewhere with a reason to lose. The goal is to make tanking costly enough that it only makes sense in extreme situations.
3-2-1 cuts tanking from 6.9% to 0.9% in our simulations. All 14 picks go through the lottery, so even mediocre non-playoff teams get a real shot at any slot. Teams near the bottom three threshold have genuine reason to compete instead of lose. And it requires no new infrastructure. Just a rebalancing of balls.
3-2-1 closes the door on tanking for teams already out of playoff contention. But it leaves another door open. In a year with a generational prospect, a bubble team might decide the pick is worth more than a first-round exit. Miss the playoffs on purpose, collect your three lottery balls, take your shot. The system cannot stop that calculation. And if it happens, the cruel irony is that the worst teams in the league get fewer balls than the teams that chose to lose. The prospect most needed at the bottom goes somewhere else.
One more thing: the NBA is treating 3-2-1 as a 3-year experiment. If it doesn't reduce tanking in practice, they'll revisit.
Our results assume a playoff berth is worth 200 simulation points. Raise that threshold, or introduce a generational-class prospect, and the calculus shifts. The mechanism's robustness to extreme draft years remains an open question.
This essay is the readable version of our formal research paper. If you want the proofs, the model details, or just to check our work, here's everything we read to build it.